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I. Introduction 
There was a cold front hitting the Eastern Shore of Canada 
and the United States in February 2008 when my partner and I 
left Boston for a long weekend in picturesque Quebec. Stopping for 
lunch at Derby Line, Vermont, we entered the one-room opera 
house turned library. Like something from the Wizard of Oz, a 
strip of yellow tape marked the boundary between the two 
countries. Books were displayed in the United States, the 
circulation desk sat in Canada. Just outside, a sign halfway up the 
block marked the dividing line yet again. Quickly, we walked 
around the block, my fascination acting as a buffer against the 
sub-zero temperatures. Born and raised in south Texas, I was 
astonished at the contrast. There were no guards, no guns, no 
fences. Only cute houses and piles of snow.  
Borders are not born; they are made. As creatures of law and 
brute force, they shift shapes. Speaking at a large industry 
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1394 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1393 (2018) 
convention called the Border Security Expo in early 2018, Elaine 
Duke, the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, alluded to the 
role that law and law enforcement play in turning geographical 
spaces into juridical dividing lines.1 “We used to distinguish 
between border security and interior enforcement. Now we’re 
lumping it all under border security,” she said.2 The border, it 
seems, is now everywhere.  
Duke’s comments laid bare the ugly, uninterrupted reality 
that has existed in many communities of color for many years. Just 
as the nation’s interior is now the border, the United States border 
has long been the interior. Three decades ago, the internal 
operations of my poor, Mexican community in south Texas were 
my personal and communal interior; this was the place I called 
home just as millions of others do now. Yet my interior was 
someone else’s border. Immigration policing, the keen observer of 
urban life Mike Davis wrote almost twenty years ago, sits in 
Latinos’ front yard.3 The border could be policed exceptionally 
because it was removed from the lived experiences of legislators 
and policy advocates in the nation’s interior. Meanwhile, my 
border was someone else’s interior. Stepping off an airplane for the 
first time as a high school student, I visited the foreign landscape 
of Washington, D.C. A few years later, I drove from south Texas to 
Rhode Island, staring bewilderingly at the changing landscape and 
New England’s foreign culture. As Duke’s comments suggest, law 
and policy alter borders. So, too, do culture and rhetoric. 
In the second year of the Trump Administration, legislators 
and advocates find themselves facing shifting borders in another 
way. Political norms that were once off-limits are now accepted 
pressure tactics. This is no more evident than in tensions over 
                                                                                                     
 1. Elaine Duke, Deputy Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, 
Opening Keynote at the Border Security Expo (Jan. 31, 2018).  
 2. See Roque Planas (@RoqPlanas), TWITTER (Jan. 31, 2018, 6:45 AM), 
https://twitter.com/RoqPlanas/status/958712785189433345 (last visited Sept. 20, 
2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). A similar development 
is occurring in Southern Europe. See MATTEO AMBROSINI, IRREGULAR IMMIGRATION 
IN SOUTHERN EUROPE 68 (2018) (“Border controls . . . are increasingly being 
supplemented with policies of exclusion and discouragement of those unwanted 
aliens who passed the border.”). 
 3. MIKE DAVIS, MAGICAL URBANISM: LATINOS REINVENT THE U.S. CITY 59 
(2000). 
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immigration policies. As the Trump Administration continues to 
ratchet up the severity of the federal government’s immigration 
policing tactics, state and local officials find themselves in an 
unfamiliar light. To high-level officials in the Trump 
Administration, elected officials who do not follow the 
Administration’s heavy-handed approach to immigration law 
enforcement are no different from the migrants the federal 
government is targeting. They are, as acting head of the 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency Thomas Homan 
said of the Oakland mayor, akin to gang members.4 
The Trump Administration’s equivalent vilification of 
migrants and their allies presents an opportunity, but not one 
without substantial complications. Liberal elected officials, long 
accustomed to avoiding the ire of personal liability, are seeing their 
traditional insulation come under attack.5 Faced with federal 
officials who view them as complicit in endangering the public, 
they are presented with the opportunity to embrace a politics of 
solidarity with migrants by pushing the boundaries of previously 
acceptable policies.6 No example has gained more currency since 
President Trump entered the White House than immigrant 
defense funds, pools of public or private dollars intended to assist 
migrants facing the possibility of immigration imprisonment or 
removal.7 Several immigrant defense funds now exist, and others 
are in the planning stages.8 As they have gained currency, 
however, immigrant defense funds have become sites of 
contestation between competing visions of who deserves to belong 
in the United States.9 Membership in the political community is 
                                                                                                     
 4. US Immigration Attacks Oakland Mayor for Warning of Raid That 
Arrested 150, GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2018/feb/28/ice-immigration-raid-northern-california-oakland-mayor-
warning (last visited Sept. 20, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 5. See infra notes 19–24 and accompanying text (discussing the acting ICE 
Director’s criticism of public officials’ efforts to limit cooperation with ICE). 
 6. See infra notes 19–24 and accompanying text (describing the acting ICE 
Director’s frustration with “sanctuary cities”). 
 7. See infra Part III (discussing immigrant defense funds under the Trump 
administration).  
 8. See infra Part III (describing an increase in immigrant defense funds).  
 9. See infra Part III (noting the debate surrounding the funds’ 
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being hashed out through debates about limitations on the use of 
immigrant defense funds’ finite resources.10 
This Essay examines the increasing popularity of immigrant 
defense funds with a critical lens toward common exclusions 
against people convicted of certain crimes.11 It argues that framing 
these funds as progressive responses to the Trump 
administration’s unjustified targeting of migrants is conceptually 
and politically problematic.12 Treating migrants as victims of 
excessive cruelty fosters an innocence narrative that is factually 
misleading because migrants in need of legal counsel are not any 
more innocent than anyone else.13 Constructing defense funds 
around false narratives means that the rationale for the defense 
funds’ existence is likely to crumble and, with it, the funds 
themselves. For the many migrants who stand to benefit 
enormously from defense fund legal representation, this is too 
much of a risk. Instead, this Essay urges advocates and elected 
officials to envision immigrant defense funds as responses to 
embedded racial and class discrimination in the substance and 
procedure of criminal and immigration law practices as they have 
melded into crimmigration.14 
II. Converging Interests 
For good reason, elected officials are insulated from 
prosecution for carrying out their legislative duties.15 Free of the 
                                                                                                     
disbursements). 
 10. See infra Part III (discussing immigrant defense funds).   
 11. See infra Part IV (explaining that immigrant defense funds exclude 
people with certain criminal records). 
 12. See infra Part V (exploring the intersection of morality and jurisdictions’ 
imagined identities).  
 13. See infra Part V (noting issues stemming from a misconception of 
innocence). 
 14. See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 381 (1951) (explaining that 
legislators are free from arrest or civil process for what they do or say in 
legislative proceedings). 
 15. Id. at 377 (“Legislators are immune from the deterrents to the 
uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty, not for their private indulgence 
but for the public good.”). 
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threat of imprisonment, they are able to serve “the public good.”16 
Elaborating, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
explained,  
Legislative immunity enables officials to serve the public 
without fear of personal liability. Not only may the risk of 
liability deter an official from proper action, but the litigation 
itself “creates a distraction and forces legislators to divert their 
time, energy, and attention from their legislative tasks to 
defend the litigation.”17  
Protecting the public by insulating their representatives, wrote 
Justice Clarence Thomas for a unanimous Supreme Court, has 
been part of Anglo-American law since “the Parliamentary 
struggles of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries’ and was 
‘taken as a matter of course by those who severed the Colonies 
from the Crown and founded our Nation.’”18 
Despite the doctrine of legislative immunity’s impressive 
lineage and adamant support within the judiciary, a Trump 
Administration top immigration law enforcement official became 
harshly critical of legislators who took positions out of line with 
administration objectives.19 A holdover from the Obama 
Administration, Thomas Homan served as Immigration and 
Custom Enforcement’s (ICE) acting director for most of the 
administration’s first two years.20 Homan took a broad view of 
ICE’s authority that fits comfortably within the heavy-handed 
approach favored by President Trump and Attorney General Jeff 
                                                                                                     
 16. Id.  
 17. Sable v. Myers, 563 F.3d 1120, 1123–24 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 18. Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 48–49 (1998). 
 19. Acting ICE Director Wants Politicians in Sanctuary Cities Charged with 
Crimes, CBS NEWS, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/acting-ice-director-wants-
politicians-in-sanctuary-cities-charged-with-crimes/ (last updated Jan. 3, 2018, 
11:54 PM) (last visited Sept. 20, 2018) [hereinafter ICE Director] (explaining that 
Homan believes politicians who run sanctuary cities should be charged with 
crimes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 20. Homan stepped down before action on his confirmation. See Tom Homan, 
Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Set to Retire, CBS 
NEWS (May 1, 2018, 7:17 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/tom-homan-acting-
director-of-immigration-and-customs-enforcement-set-to-retire/ (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2018) (“Tom Homan, the acting director of the agency charged with 
combating illegal immigration, is stepping down . . . .”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Sessions.21 Like his colleagues, Homan frequently criticized city 
and county efforts to limit cooperation with ICE as “sanctuary 
cities.”22 In December 2017, Homan broke ground among leading 
administration officials by endorsing criminal prosecution of 
elected officials in these jurisdictions.23 In an interview aired on 
Fox News, Homan said, “We’ve got to take these sanctuary cities 
on, we’ve got to take them to court and we’ve got to start charging 
some of these politicians with crimes.”24  
Calling for criminal prosecution of elected officials who 
support policies that Homan thinks are unwise, even illegal, is a 
new development in the long-heated political fray over 
immigration. To threaten political opponents with 
prosecution— presumably even with imprisonment upon 
conviction—is to move far beyond the realm of acceptable discourse 
for top representatives of the federal government. Despite that 
breach of a political norm, actual conviction and imprisonment is 
unlikely of any elected official simply for taking a friendlier 
approach toward migrants than Homan and his colleagues would 
like. The current political moment is not the first period in which 
ideological battles have been pitched.25 In the midst of Cold War 
hysteria, the Supreme Court noted, “In times of political passion, 
dishonest or vindictive motives are readily attributed to legislative 
conduct and as readily believed.”26 Decades later, the legislative 
immunity doctrine remains robust.27  
Nonetheless, Homan’s comment illustrates one way in which 
the Trump Administration has redrawn political alliances related 
to immigration. A strong immunity doctrine may prevent 
                                                                                                     
 21. See ICE Director, supra note 19 (describing Homan’s strong approach to 
California’s “sanctuary state” law). 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. 
 24. Elise Foley & Roque Planas, Trump ICE Chief Wants to Prosecute 
Politicians Who Won’t Lock Up More Immigrants, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/immigration-ice-sanctuary-
policies_us_5a4d6610e4b06d1621bd0682 (last visited Sept. 20, 2018) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 25. See e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 380–83 (1951) (debating 
legislative free speech against a backdrop of fascism and civil rights). 
 26. Id. at 378. 
 27. See Bogan, 523 U.S. at 49 (“State and regional legislators are entitled to 
absolute immunity from liability.”). 
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conviction, but it does not stop prosecution and the heavy toll the 
mere threat of criminal punishment entails. To Homan and his 
administration’s supporters, the distinction between migrant 
lawbreakers and some supportive elected representatives has 
blurred to the point of irrelevance. Perhaps it has ceased to exist 
altogether. President Trump seems to see himself as waging a 
hero’s fight against the myriad forces allied against a white, 
Christian citizenry. In that battle between good and evil, Trump 
Administration officials are on the side of good; everyone else has 
lined up with the enemy.  
The Trump Administration’s fairy tale version of 
contemporary politics opens the possibility of innovative 
oppositional alliances. In his canonical 1980 article, Brown v. 
Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, the 
late Derrick Bell offered a stinging critique of school desegregation 
litigation and an equally damning assessment of the hegemony of 
racism in the United States.28 “The interest of blacks in achieving 
racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with 
the interests of whites,” he wrote.29 Bell’s theory painted racial 
group interests too broadly,30 but its central theoretical 
contribution remains persuasive: the possibility of forward-moving 
shifts in the law exist in moments in which elite interests align 
with those of subordinated groups.31 Like immigration law 
policing, the law’s borders can move. Through the power of 
opportunistic alliances, the Trump Administration’s virulent 
attacks on the political elites of cities, counties, and states offers a 
tantalizing moment of interest convergence.32 If nothing and no 
                                                                                                     
 28. See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education 
and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980). 
 29. Id. at 523. 
 30. See Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 105 NW. 
U. L. REV. 149, 156, 165–69 (2011) (“[T]he theory’s overly broad conceptualization 
of ‘black interests’ and ‘white interests’ obscures the intensely contested disputes 
regarding what those terms actually mean.”). 
31. See Bell, supra note 28, at 528 (“Further progress to fulfill the mandate 
of Brown is possible to the extent that the divergence of racial interests can be 
avoided or minimized.”). 
 32. See Cathleen Decker, Trump’s War Against Elites and Expertise, L.A. 
TIMES (July 27, 2017 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-
elites-20170725-story.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2018) (discussing Trump’s various 
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one is safe from the Trump Administration’s threats, then elected 
officials might as well do what they think is right to defend 
migrants. 
III. Immigrant Defense Funds 
This leads, of course, to the most important question: what is 
the right thing to do? The U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) can deploy ICE and Border Patrol agents where and how it 
sees fit in the United States.33 With almost 40,000 law enforcement 
officers between them, this is a sizable policing apparatus.34 
Despite renewed interest in “sanctuary” city declarations, no 
sub-federal government entity can actually guarantee freedom 
from immigration imprisonment and deportation.35 As a result, 
some activists and academics have correctly noted that the 
“sanctuary” label is incomplete and potentially misleading.36  
                                                                                                     
attacks on political figures) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 33. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., AN 
ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPOSAL TO MERGE CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WITH 
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 17 (2005) (describing the division of 
immigration law enforcement authority split between the DHS Customs and 
Border Protection, including the Border Patrol, and Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement).  
 34. See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, ICE Enforcement Actions: 
Something Old, Something New, CRIMMIGRATION (Feb. 14, 2017, 4:00 AM), 
http://crimmigration.com/2017/02/14/ice-enforcement-actions/ (last visited Sept. 
20, 2018) ([W]ith 40,000 employees as his disposal . . . he does have the ability to 
throw the nightmare of the last eight years into overdrive.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 35. See Michael Kagan, The Truth About Sanctuary Cities, NEV. INDEP. (June 
29, 2017, 3:00 AM), https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/sanctuary-
campaigns-a-political-liability (last visited Sept. 20, 2018) (“To declare their 
territory to be a ‘sanctuary’ sounds like active resistance, implying that they will 
somehow obstruct federal officers, or that they can grant some kind of immunity 
from federal law. Of course, they can’t. And they don’t.”). 
 36. See, e.g., id. (“The word ‘sanctuary’ suggests a place of safety, protection 
and shelter. Merriam-Webster says that it can also mean ‘the immunity from law.’ 
Therein lies the problem.”); Michael Kagan, What Do We Mean When We Talk 
About Sanctuary Cities?, NEV. INDEP. (May 14, 2017, 3:40 AM), 
https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/what-do-we-mean-when-we-talk-about- 
sanctuary-cities (last visited Sept. 20, 2018) (“No one knows exactly what a 
sanctuary city is.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Shakeer 
Rahman & Robin Steinberg, Sanctuary Cities in Name Only, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 
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Whether or not the sanctuary label is used, some elected 
officials are promoting migrants’ place in the United States 
through the creation of immigrant defense funds.37 From New York 
City’s pioneering example in 2013 to efforts in Chicago, Los 
Angeles, and smaller cities like Seattle and Denver, elected 
officials are attempting to protect migrants by sheathing them 
with the law.38 By equipping migrants facing the possibility of 
removal with legal counsel, local communities can limit the 
number of people removed because they were too poor to hire a 
lawyer.39 Instead of suffering from the morally indefensible 
vagaries of poverty, communities that have created immigrant 
defense funds embrace the hallmark of access to justice campaigns; 
the outcome of judicial processes is not legitimate if people are not 
equipped to understand, as Justice Sutherland wrote on behalf of 
the majority of the Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama,40 “the 
science of law.”41 Hauled into immigration court without counsel, 
migrants are essentially forced to fight for their right to remain in 
                                                                                                     
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/opinion/sanctuary-cities-in-name-
only.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2018) (“It’s not enough for cities like New York to 
declare themselves ‘sanctuaries,’ which simply means that the local police won’t 
detain noncitizens on the federal government’s behalf.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Sophie Quinton, Controversy Over “Sanctuary” 
Campuses is Misleading, Legal Analysts Say, PBS (Dec. 17, 2016), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/sanctuary-campus-controversial (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2018) (“There’s no consensus on what it means to be a sanctuary 
campus. And the word ‘sanctuary’ inflates the relatively minor demands that 
activists are asking of college administrators.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); Alex Kotlowitz, The Limits of Sanctuary Cities, NEW YORKER 
(Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-limits-of-
sanctuary-cities (last visited Sept. 20, 2018) (“What these mayors didn’t say, 
however, was how their municipalities would be able to prevent the federal 
government from exerting its authority—and what they mean by the term 
‘sanctuary city.’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 37. See, e.g., Maura Ewing, Should Taxpayers Sponsor Attorneys 
for Undocumented Immigrants, ATLANTIC (May 4, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/should-taxpayers-sponsor-
attorneys-for-undocumented-immigrants/525162/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2018) 
(exploring how some cities and states are funding pro-bono legal counsel for 
deportation proceedings) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 38. See id. (describing municipal legislation funding defense funds).  
 39. See id. (describing the funding of pro-bono legal services). 
 40. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 41. Id. at 69.  
1402 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1393 (2018) 
the United States blindfolded and with one hand tied behind their 
backs. Defense funds are one concrete attempt to force a sense of 
fairness into immigration law, long criticized as a present-day 
bastion of de jure discrimination.42 
The success that immigrant defense funds ultimately have is 
constrained by multiple design limits. Funding is the most obvious. 
Cities, counties, and states are facing the prospect of making 
sizeable financial contributions to the well-being of migrants. 
Offsetting some of the cost, a number of individual and private 
philanthropists have shown themselves willing to partner with 
government entities.43 In addition, the small number of fiscal 
analyses that have been done of immigrant defense funds indicate 
that they partly offset their operational costs by avoiding expenses 
associated with facing immigration court cases without legal 
counsel.44 Nonetheless, the financial outlay is substantial.45 Where 
the political will is present, though, some governments at least 
have proven themselves able to find the money.46 
                                                                                                     
 42. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Doubling Down on Racial Discrimination: 
The Racially Disparate Impacts of Crime-Based Removals, 66 CASE. W. RES. L. 
REV. 993, 1010 (2016) (explaining that “law enforcement agencies frequently 
employ race as a central investigatory tool in contemporary criminal and 
immigration enforcement”); D. Carolina Núñez, Inside the Border, Outside the 
Law: Undocumented Immigrants and the Fourth Amendment, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 
85, 87–88 (2011) (criticizing a Supreme Court opinion holding that the Fourth 
Amendment did not apply to a Mexican citizen arrested and brought to the United 
States at the behest of United States law enforcement officers and whose home 
was searched by United States agents); Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration 
Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A “Magic Mirror” into the Heart of Darkness, 
73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1133 (1998) (describing the disparate impact of facially neutral 
immigration laws since 1965). 
 43. See, e.g., Press Release, Vera Inst. of Just., SAFE Cities Network 
Launches: 11 Communities United to Provide Public Defense to Immigrants 
Facing Deportation (Nov. 9, 2017) (describing the Vera Institute of Justice’s Safe 
Cities Network as providing, among other things, grant funds to governments 
willing to use public money to operate immigrant defense funds) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 44. See JENNIFER STAVE ET AL., EVALUATION OF THE NEW YORK IMMIGRANT 
FAMILY UNITY PROJECT: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION ON 
FAMILY AND COMMUNITY UNITY 58 tbl.14 (2017) (estimating that New York City’s 
immigrant defense fund resulted in $2.7 million in federal, state, and local taxes 
annually). 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. 
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A second implementation obstacle arises directly from the 
question of political will. As immigrant defense funds have been 
planned and launched, advocates and policymakers have 
repeatedly grappled with the question of eligibility.47 That is, who 
should the fund help? In search of cost-cutting measures, 
policymakers have frequently supported an exclusion for people 
convicted of certain criminal offenses.48 These people are 
prohibited from accessing services paid for by immigrant defense 
funds.49 To date, almost all jurisdictions that have created an 
immigrant defense fund have excluded people with certain 
criminal histories.50 Even in New York City, which pioneered 
immigrant defense funds and where a robust advocacy network 
exists that is firmly committed to universal representation, the 
mayor has held firm to his position that people convicted of well 
over 100 crimes should not receive city funding.51 After a heated 
campaign, opposing sides agreed to find private dollars to cover the 
people who the mayor wanted to exclude.52  
Going far beyond measuring a jurisdiction’s ability to allocate 
financial resources, immigrant defense fund exclusions implicate 
important normative questions of membership. Debates over 
excluding some people and not others flag important but hidden 
                                                                                                     
 47. See Emma Whitford, Immigrant Advocates Say NYC Legal Defense 
Funding Plan Limits Due Process, GOTHAMIST (May 11, 2017, 3:30 PM), 
http://gothamist.com/2017/05/11/immigrant_legal_defense_nyc.php (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2018) (“Mayor Bill de Blasio highlighted $16.4 million to fund legal 
representation for non-citizen defendants in immigration court . . . [b]ut the 
funding is conditional, excluding New Yorkers who have been convicted of any of 
170 felonies . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 48. See id. (excluding those who have committed felonies deemed “violent 
and serious”).  
 49. See id. (noting the felony exemptions from New York City’s sanctuary 
protections).  
 50. Id.  
 51. Id.  
 52. See Emma Whitford, Anonymous Donation Secures Immigrant Defense 
Funding Without Restrictions, GOTHAMIST (Aug. 1, 2017, 10:42 AM), 
http://gothamist.com/2017/08/01/anonymous_donation_secures_immigran.php 
(last visited Sept. 20, 2018) (“An injection of private cash is behind a compromise 
this week that will fund legal representation for all indigent immigrant New 
Yorkers at risk of deportation regardless of their criminal history. . . .”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
1404 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1393 (2018) 
ideological commitments about who deserves to make claims on 
the United States. As articulated in immigration scholarship, 
membership theory focuses attention on the markers of belonging 
in a particular community.53 While it is clear that migrants 
participate in United States civic, economic, and political life, it is 
equally clear that, as a matter of law, they are not considered full 
members in the political community.54  
The historical treatment of migrants as “Americans in 
waiting”55 has become much more attenuated, especially for 
individuals who have engaged in criminal activity. For most of its 
history, the United States did not rely heavily on criminal law to 
indicate that a particular migrant was poorly suited to live or work 
within its borders. By the end of the twentieth century, though, 
criminal law and immigration law had become heavily entangled.56 
The Supreme Court recognized this radical restructuring of both 
areas of law in its landmark 2010 decision Padilla v. Kentucky.57 
Though formally focused on the Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel, the Court prefaced its doctrinal 
intervention through a historical exegesis:  
While once there was only a narrow class of deportable offenses 
and judges wielded broad discretionary authority to prevent 
deportation, immigration reforms over time have expanded the 
class of deportable offenses and limited the authority of judges 
to alleviate the harsh consequences of deportation. The ‘drastic 
measure’ of deportation or removal is now virtually inevitable 
for a vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes.58 
                                                                                                     
 53. See infra notes 59–60 and accompanying text (examining immigration 
scholarship that addresses membership theory).  
 54. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(3) (2012) (defining “alien” in opposition to “citizen”).  
 55. See generally HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST 
STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2007). 
 56. See Yolanda Vázquez, Enforcing the Politics of Race and Identity in 
Migration and Crime Control Policies, in RACE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AND MIGRATION 
CONTROL: ENFORCING THE BOUNDARIES OF BELONGING 142, 144 (Mary Bosworth et 
al. eds., 2018) (describing recent effects of criminal law and immigration law’s 
entanglement). 
 57. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).  
 58. Id. at 360 (quoting Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)). 
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Membership theory is remarkably well situated to examine the 
exclusions being debated and built into immigrant defense funds. 
“In its simplest form, membership is about belonging and 
inclusion,” writes D. Carolina Núñez.59 At times defined according 
to territorial presence, at times according to status recognition 
conferred by formal law, membership theory arises in immigrant 
defense fund conversations as a “substitute[] for a more principled 
analysis of an individual’s membership in the United States.”60 
IV. Playing with Morality 
Policymakers’ consistent insistence on excluding people with 
certain criminal records from accessing immigrant defense funds 
suggests that criminality is a reliable measure of moral worth. 
This loose approach runs through immigration law and policy 
rhetoric. From President Trump to Attorney General Sessions to 
ICE Acting Director Homan, high-ranking officials repeatedly 
harp about the dangers migrants pose.61 President Obama 
famously described his Administration’s immigration law 
enforcement priorities as targeting “felons, not families. Criminals, 
not children. Gang members, not a mom who’s working hard to 
provide for her kids.”62 For his part, President Trump repeated his 
depiction of migrants as murderous gang members throughout his 
campaign and in more rarified events such as his 2018 State of the 
Union speech.63 
Excluding migrants from defense funds because of their 
interactions with the criminal justice system follows in this vein. 
                                                                                                     
 59. Núñez, supra note 42, at 112. 
 60. Id. at 138. 
 61. See, e.g., Jane C. Timm, Trump Says ‘Caravans’ of Immigrants are 
Headed for the U.S. What’s He Talking About?, NBC NEWS APR. 2, 2018, 4:43 
PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/trump-says-caravans-immi 
grants- are-headed-u-s-what-s-n862136 (last updated Apr. 5, 2018, 11:20 AM) 
(last visited Sept. 20, 2018) (discussing the President’s tweets about the 
dangerous “caravans” of immigrants headed to the U.S. border, bringing drugs 
and crime with them) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 62. Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President in 
Address to the Nation on Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014). 
 63. See Donald J. Trump, President of the U.S., State of the Union Address 
(January 30, 2018) (“For decades, open borders have allowed drugs and gangs to 
pour into our most vulnerable communities.”). 
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It presupposes that some people are not worthy of the 
government’s assistance and that criminal histories are suitable 
proxies of worth. This logic is as simple as it is flawed. Accepting 
the logic that crime is a suitable marker of membership requires 
ignoring a series of prudential and normative pitfalls. First, this 
logic assumes that it is possible to determine who has engaged in 
criminal activity and who has not. To begin, people who have been 
convicted of a crime cannot necessarily be said to have performed 
the required actions, along with the mandated mental state, to 
satisfy the various elements of a given offense of conviction. Almost 
all convictions in recent years have resulted from the “horse 
trading” of plea negotiations between prosecutor and defense 
counsel, leading the Supreme Court to declare plea bargaining “not 
some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal 
justice system.”64 Numerous examples exist of people who pleaded 
guilty only to have scientific evidence later unravel the 
conviction.65 Similarly, it is common for people to plead guilty to a 
lesser offense to ensure that a prosecutor backs off pursuing 
conviction for a more serious crime. Though judges are required to 
ensure that there is a factual basis for a plea before accepting it,66 
it would defy all but the most superficial familiarity with plea 
negotiations to believe that this standard is fail-safe.  
Second, focusing solely on the formal metric of criminality is 
imprecise because the very gauge used to determine if criminal 
activity occurred—a conviction—is itself contested. The definition 
of “conviction” used for purposes of immigration law does not 
conform to many penal definitions of the term, thus treating as 
criminals some people who the criminal justice system has not 
marked as such.67 The Immigration and Nationality Act explicitly 
treats as a conviction any proceeding in which an “adjudication of 
                                                                                                     
 64. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (quoting Robert E. Scott & William 
J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)). 
 65. See BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 150 (2011) (noting that, of the first 250 convicted 
individuals who were later exonerated by DNA evidence, 6% had been convicted 
by plea). 
 66. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3) (“Before entering judgment on a guilty plea, 
the court must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.”). 
 67. See generally INA § 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2012). 
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guilt has been withheld.”68 Many states do not.69 As such, it is not 
unusual for a state criminal proceeding to decline to impose 
criminal punishment on the very individual who is viewed as a 
criminal for purposes of federal immigration law.70 This results in 
the odd, but common, situation in which a person is both a criminal 
and not a criminal: a criminal under federal immigration law, but 
not a criminal under the state criminal law that actually governed 
the person’s criminal proceeding.71 
Third, neither policing nor substantive criminal law in the 
United States aspire to comprehensively identify all perpetrators 
of crime. On the contrary, “discretion is essential to the criminal 
justice process,” the Supreme Court explained in McCleskey v. 
Kemp.72 Most crime is not reported to the police.73 When it is, police 
officers are not required to investigate all allegations of criminal 
activity.74 On the contrary, individual officers and law enforcement 
agencies are afforded substantial discretion about how to deploy 
investigative resources.75 Likewise, prosecutors are rarely under 
an affirmative obligation to pursue criminal charges.76 The 
strength of evidence is irrelevant.77 The Supreme Court is quite 
                                                                                                     
 68. Id. 
 69. See CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, CRIMMIGRATION LAW 28–29 
(2015) (describing the state standards for criminal conviction). 
 70. See id. (highlighting the differences between the criminal and 
immigration systems).  
 71. See id. (emphasizing inconsistencies that result from different 
definitions of “criminal”). 
 72. 481 U.S. 279, 296 (1987). 
 73. See JENNIFER L. TRUMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 
2015 5 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv15.pdf (reporting that, in 
2015, less than half of violent crime and property crime was reported to police). 
 74. See Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal 
Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 
543, 552 (1960) (noting that police officers sometimes do not investigate activity 
that they believe constitutes crime). 
 75. See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Choosing Anti-Terror Targets by 
National Origin and Race, 6 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 9, 32 (2003) (“[S]carce 
resources do not permit officers to investigate everyone.”). 
 76. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (explaining that the 
prosecution has broad discretion as to whom to prosecute). 
 77. See id. (“Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s 
general deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s 
relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan are not readily 
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clear that the judiciary will rarely second-guess prosecutorial 
decisions.78 In McCleskey, the Court turned in part to “the policy 
considerations behind a prosecutor’s traditionally ‘wide discretion’ 
[which] suggest the impropriety of our requiring prosecutors to 
defend their decisions to seek death penalties” to reject a racial 
justice-motivated constitutional challenge to death sentences.79 
Even then, courts will only examine claims that prosecutions have 
moved forward on the basis of discrimination for a protected 
reason, and they will do so with a “presumption of regularity.”80 As 
a result of the combined discretion granted to law enforcement and 
prosecutors, most criminal activity in the United States is not met 
with conviction.81 Quite simply, most criminal offenders go free. 
Fourth, using criminal activity to determine qualification for 
membership in the political community requires accepting that 
criminal activity marks people as good or bad. A prominent strain 
of criminal law’s theoretical justifications certainly claims to 
anchor criminal law in a collective morality.82 The problem with 
this theory is that it no longer stands the rigor of close scrutiny, if 
ever it did.83 The gap between shifting visions of morality and 
penal prohibitions is simply too large when it comes to many of the 
activities that lead migrants to immigration troubles because of 
                                                                                                     
susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.”). 
 78. See id. (noting a potential chilling effect on law enforcement).  
 79. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 296. 
 80. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463–64 (1996) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 81. See German Lopez, The Great Majority of Violent Crime in America Goes 
Unsolved, VOX (Mar. 1, 2017, 3:10 PM) https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2017/3/1/14777612/trump-crime-certainty-severity (last visited Oct. 2, 
2018) (“Meanwhile, less than half of violent crimes and less than one-fifth of 
property crimes that are reported are actually cleared by police and referred to 
prosecution.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 82. See, e.g., Tropp v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 86 (1958) (describing one of the 
functions of criminal law as “reprimand[ing] the wrongdoer”); MODEL PENAL CODE 
& COMMENTARIES §§ 1.02(1)(a), (c) (1962) (claiming that the Model Penal Code is 
primarily concerned with preventing harm to people and to exclude from 
criminalization “conduct that is without fault”). 
 83. See Richard C. Fuller, Morals and the Criminal Law, 32 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 624, 625 (1942) (describing examples of conduct “although criminal 
in the legal sense, is not offensive to the moral conscience of a considerable 
number of persons”). 
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criminal activity. No shift in public attitudes toward criminalized 
activity is more well-known than possession and use of small 
amounts of marijuana.84 While this remains a federal crime, by the 
start of 2018, eight states and Washington, D.C. had legalized 
recreational possession and use.85 Most other states have 
decriminalized or legalized marijuana use for medical purposes.86 
My university, located in the heart of the country’s pioneering 
experiment with recreational use legalization, offers courses on 
marijuana regulation and one of my colleagues holds a 
professorship in marijuana law.87  
Despite this movement in public attitudes, reflected in public 
opinion polls, curricular course offerings, and state penal codes, 
federal immigration law remains constant. The Immigration and 
Nationality Act’s two controlled substance offense provisions 
promise imprisonment and removal for “violation[s] of any 
law . . . of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating 
to a controlled substance.”88 Criminal law’s claim to mark moral 
                                                                                                     
84. See Scott W. Howe, Constitutional Clause Aggregation and the 
Marijuana Crimes, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 779, 782 (2018) (“Through acts of 
direct democracy, eight states plus the District of Columbia since 2012 have 
‘legalized,’ within tight limits, the possession, use, cultivation and distribution 
of marijuana for recreational purposes.”). 
 85. See State Marijuana Laws in 2018 Map, GOVERNING (Mar. 30, 2018), 
http://www.governing.com/gov-data/state-marijuana-laws-map-medical-
recreational.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2018) (demonstrating current state 
marijuana laws) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 86. See id. (detailing states where marijuana use is acceptable for medicinal 
purposes).  
 87. See, e.g., Daniels Launches Business of Marijuana Class (Mar. 24, 2017), 
http://news.du.edu/daniels-launches-business-of-marijuana-class/ (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2018) (describing a course at the University of Denver’s Daniels School 
of Business) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Cannabis 
Journalism, https://www.du.edu/specpro/interterm/fall/cannabis.html (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Faculty 
and Staff Directory: Sam Kamin, U. DENV. STURM C.L., 
https://www.law.du.edu/faculty-staff/sam-kamin (last visited Sept. 20, 2018) 
(listing Sam Kamin’s title as the “Vicente Sederberg Professor of Marijuana Law 
and Policy,” named after a prominent marijuana industry law firm) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 88. See INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2012) 
(declaring individuals who are convicted of or commit this activity inadmissible 
to the United States); id. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (declaring individuals who are convicted 
of this activity deportable from the United States). Though the deportation 
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worth loses its persuasiveness when immigration consequences 
attach differently based on the jurisdiction in which identical 
activity occurs. Possession of marijuana is celebrated as a pillar of 
Colorado’s economy and a contributor to what makes the Denver 
metropolitan region a top destination for young internal 
migrants.89 Two states over, Texas continues to criminally punish 
low-level drug offenses.90 Is moral worth to be assessed differently 
because the drug use happens in Denver rather than Dallas? 
Relying on criminal laws that treat similar conduct so differently 
to mete out immigration law consequences subverts the power of 
immigration law to lay claim to a national standard of morality. 
Lastly, using criminal adjudications as the foundation upon 
which to apply immigration consequences requires a misplaced 
faith in the ability of government officials to properly assess 
citizenship. While United States citizens and migrants are both 
subject to criminal law, citizens are immunized from immigration 
imprisonment and removal.91 Law’s formal immunization of 
citizens falls apart when government officials incorrectly identify 
a person’s citizenship status. It is not clear how often this occurs, 
but academic findings, complemented by journalistic exposes, 
indicate it does with alarming regularity.92 Political scientist 
                                                                                                     
provision exempts individuals convicted of “a single offense involving possession 
for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana,” migrants are subject to the 
inadmissibility provision if they ever leave the United States and attempt to 
return. Removal under either provision results in mandatory detention. Id. 
§ 1226(c). 
 89. See Diego Zambiasi & Steven Stillman, The Pot Rush: Is Legalized 
Marijuana a Positive Local Amenity?, IZA Discussion Paper No. 11392, at 12 
(2018), ftp://repec.iza.org/RePEc/Discussionpaper/dp11392.pdf (concluding that 
“potential migrants [from elsewhere in the United States] view legalized 
marijuana as a positive amenity” leading to increased in-migration after 
recreational use of marijuana was legalized); Marijuana Tax Data, COLORADO 
DEP’T OF REVENUE, https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/revenue/colorado-marijuana-
tax-data (last visited Oct. 2, 2018) (reporting a consistently growing rate of 
revenue generated from marijuana taxes, licenses, and fees) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 90. See, e.g., VERNON’S TEX. CODE ANN., HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.121(a) 
(2009) (“[A] person commits an offense if the person knowingly or intentionally 
possesses a usable quantity (criminalizing possession of marijuana).”). 
 91. See generally INA § 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2012). 
 92. See Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and 
Deporting U.S. Citizens as Aliens, 18 VA. J. SOC. POLICY & L. 606, 630 (2011) 
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Jacqueline Stevens estimates that from 2003 to 2011, ICE 
detained approximately 20,000 United States citizens.93 Whatever 
the actual number, the impact on affected individuals is enormous. 
Davino Watson, for example, was imprisoned by ICE for 1,273 
days—roughly three and a half years—before convincing a judge of 
his citizenship.94 Luis Fernando Juárez was deported and 
convicted of illegal reentry, a federal felony, before also convincing 
a judge that he had likely been a United States citizen for years.95 
The experiences of citizens mistaken for non-citizens means that 
even at its most basic level (demarcating between citizens and not), 
immigration law routinely fails. Adding immigration consequences 
to criminal adjudications means that citizens will be doubly 
impacted. 
Despite these problems, using criminal law to distinguish 
between desirable and undesirable people remains alluring. Its 
simplicity is appealing. Its morality tale is clear. There is a 
palpable comfort to tarring migrants stained by criminality even 
where the staining process is riddled with deficiencies because the 
mysticism of legal processes makes room for delusion. Declarations 
that “the law is the law” or “what don’t you understand about 
illegal?” highlight a barebones perspective on law and legal 
processes that does not reflect the reality of either. The rush to 
mark some migrants as dangers who are properly cast out from the 
political community reveals a desire to shape the composition of 
the political community along the same racial and class cleavages 
that are prevalent in United States criminal and immigration law 
enforcement practices.  
The messiness of the actual law or legal processes as they in 
fact transpire are relegated to the margins of relevance because of 
the underlying ideological function that criminal law and 
immigration law perform. As these two areas of law have 
converged into crimmigration, they have augmented each area’s 
                                                                                                     
(detailing the rate at which ICE is detaining and deporting U.S. citizens). 
 93. See id. (discussing the significant number of ICE detentions).  
 94. See Watson v. United States, 865 F.3d 123, 136 (2d Cir. 2017) (“In sum, 
there is no doubt that the government botched the investigation into Watson’s 
assertion of citizenship . . . .”). 
 95. See United States v. Juarez, 672 F.3d 381, 384–85 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(describing his various attempts to prove citizenship). 
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membership selection power. Both, writes Juliet Stumpf in her 
article articulating crimmigration law for the first time, “are, at 
their core, systems of inclusion and exclusion. They are similarly 
designed to determine whether and how to include individuals as 
members of society or exclude them from it. Both create insiders 
and outsiders.”96 She might have added that both are also 
constitutive of the other. There can be no insiders without 
outsiders. Marking some people as unworthy of participation in the 
political community means that others are worthy. Targeting 
people thought to be migrants based on the moral stain attached 
to criminality allows everyone who escapes this target to imagine 
themselves as more deserving. Physical segregation—whether 
through imprisonment or forcible removal to somewhere outside 
the territorial boundaries of the United States—is therefore 
justified by a commitment to an ideology of marginalization and its 
corollary, exploitation. By identifying some people as less worthy 
than others, it is possible to shift them around the face of the 
earth—from the isolation of an immigration prison to the distance 
of another country—with little concern for the psychological and 
physical toll that they or their loved ones experience. Indeed, the 
deservingness trope permits the deserving to feel good about 
hoisting pain onto others. There is pleasure in the infliction of pain 
because the latter is the price of the rule of law; the price of 
legality; the cost of civilization. Without pain, the rule of law, law 
itself, our way of life would crumble—or so goes the tale.  
V. This is Not a Morality Play 
The poor fit between morality on the one hand and law and 
legal processes on the other illustrates that fights over 
membership are not primarily about moral worth.97 Rather, 
contests about the proper composition of any political community 
are principally concerned with ideology and politics—with the 
questions of the jurisdiction’s imagined identity and the process of 
                                                                                                     
 96. Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime and 
Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 380 (2006). 
 97. See supra Part IV (explaining that immigrant defense funds exclude 
people with certain criminal records).  
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creating and maintaining that self-image. In her analysis of early 
twentieth century war-torn Europe, Hannah Arendt revealed the 
ideological dimension of modern humanity’s most significant moral 
failure.98 Jews, she wrote, became the “scum of the earth” because 
they were marked by law as unworthy.99 As the dregs, they were 
stripped of juridical rights.100 In the legal framework of the era, the 
law no longer recognized them as people.101 Having lost the “right 
to have rights,” they could then be “exp[elled] from humanity 
altogether” and stripped of life.102 The civilized communities could 
turn their backs on Jews’ pleas, shut the doors to safety as Jews 
knocked seeking refuge, and let them meet their waiting fates—all 
because the law had marked them as outside its protective 
embrace.103 Having lost a claim to citizenship in a state, they were 
ejected “out of legality.”104 Law had instead marked them as fodder 
for civilization’s engine.105 Arendt’s analysis of the Holocaust and 
post-war Europe signals the extreme end of using law to carve the 
world into deserving and undeserving enclosures.106  
Immigrant defense funds arise in a vastly different context, 
but they similarly suffer from an egotistical belief that some people 
are good and others bad, and that law and legal processes can 
determine who falls into which box.107 This is politics performed 
under the guise of morality.108 To exclude people from legal 
representation based on categorical assessments of worth 
measured by criminal histories is to ignore the nuances of law and 
                                                                                                     
 98. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1948) 
(Harcourt Brace & Company ed. 1973).  
 99. Id. at 269.  
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 297. 
 103. See id. at 296 (“Even the Nazis started their extermination of Jews by 
first depriving them of all legal status (the status of second-class citizenship) and 
cutting them off from the world. . . .”). 
 104. Id. at 294. 
 105. Id.  
 106. Id.  
 107. See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text (describing New York 
City’s choice to limit its defense fund). 
 108. See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text (noting that funding was 
available for those without violent felony convictions). 
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legal processes in favor of feel-good self-righteousness. By 
excluding people with certain criminal histories, defense funds 
treat those individuals as disposable. They are characterized as 
unworthy of public funding because public funding should be 
reserved for the meritorious uncriminals, the bulk of people who 
have escaped the criminal label whether or not they have avoided 
engaging in criminal activity.109 Casting people with criminal 
histories as morally unworthy can deflect attention from the 
ideological function of racially biased criminal and immigration 
legal processes, but it cannot sanitize—and should not be allowed 
to conceal—the deceit. Defense fund exclusions, as the latest 
example of policymakers standing in judgment and distributing 
the fruits of the public fisc through racially biased policies, offers a 
renewed opportunity to expose the subterfuge at play. An 
immigration law enforcement regime built on top of a racially 
biased criminal justice system is not suddenly, magically cured of 
that bias. On the contrary, the bias is just buried. 
This willingness to write off some human lives because they 
have been marked with the stigma of criminality represents an 
opportunity to expand political alliances and subvert dominant 
discursive frames. In the spirit of Derrick Bell’s interest 
convergence theory, the development of defense funds offers an 
opportunity to draw parallels between migrants’ rights and the 
decades-long denigration of African American and Latino youth 
based on racialized markers of undesirability.110 In many of the 
urban areas where immigrant defense funds have been created, 
advocates and elected officials have long grappled with the 
complexities of race-based criminal policing.111 Those 
conversations provide fertile ground for similarly critical 
discussions of crime-based immigration consequences.  
                                                                                                     
 109. See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text (excluding over 170 
individuals from funding for violent felonies).  
 110. See Bell, supra note 28, at 526–33 (explaining why school desegregation 
has failed and offering ideas for what can be done to bring about change).   
 111. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 588–89 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (describing racially biased criminal policing in New York City); 
PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE KNIFE: POLICE VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAS 39–57 
(1995) (describing race-based criminal policing in Los Angeles). 
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In highlighting the troubling ideological genealogy of 
crime-based exclusions to immigrant defense fund participation, 
the goal should not be to humanize migrants. They are already 
human. Suggesting that participation in a newly created 
immigrant defense fund would humanize migrants is, as Agon 
Hamza wrote of the arrival of Middle Eastern and African refugees 
in Europe, to “reduc[e], problematically, complexities to a moral 
order.”112 While morality forms part of the story of the 
criminalization of migration, it is only a supporting actor. The lead 
role is left to political ideology. The discursive focus of immigrant 
defense funds, therefore, must likewise remain on the political 
ideology of criminalization.  
As with all political contests between competing ideologies, 
there is substantial risk that immigrant defense funds will develop 
embedded with familiar racial and class biases. It is difficult 
enough to launch an immigrant defense fund that the urge to forgo 
tough political fights about demonized individuals is intense. 
Measured through the narrow lens of legislative affairs, it is much 
easier to support exclusion of people with criminal histories.113 
Many campaigns to create immigrant defense funds risk falling 
into this marginalizing pattern due to the politics of the current 
historical moment, but it is worth remembering that migrants did 
not have an easy time under President Obama either.114 
Nicknamed “deporter-in-chief” because he presided over the 
largest number of removals in the history of any presidential 
administration,115 President Obama also governed during a period 
of a historically unprecedented number of criminal prosecutions 
                                                                                                     
 112. Agon Hamza, The Refugee Crisis and the Helplessness of the Left, in THE 
FINAL COUNTDOWN: EUROPE, REFUGEES AND THE LEFT 167, 176 (Jela Krečič ed., 
2017). 
 113. See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text (noting that New York 
City’s policy to exclude felons was a way to comply with the pressure from the 
Trump Administration’s immigration policy demands).  
 114. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (explaining Obama’s 
immigration policies).  
 115. See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Removals & Returns, 
1892– 2015, CRIMMIGRATION (Feb. 16, 2017, 4:00 AM), http://crimmigration. 
com/2017/02/16/removals-returns-1892-2015/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2018) 
(displaying annual removal data from 1892 to 2015) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
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for immigration activity116 and a similarly unusually high rate of 
immigration imprisonment.117 Yet with the exception of New York 
City, none of the immigrant defense funds that currently exist 
were launched during the Obama era.118 Instead, elected officials 
and many advocates turned to immigrant defense funds only after 
Donald Trump won the presidency.119 Perceiving the Trump 
Administration as radically more antagonistic toward migrants 
than its predecessor, elected officials and advocates settled on 
immigrant defense funds as a means of muting some of the Trump 
administration’s anti-migrant fury.120  
                                                                                                     
 116. Compare César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Continues 
Lead Role in Federal Criminal Prosecutions, CRIMMIGRATION (Mar. 28, 2017, 4:00 
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 117. See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Supreme Court to Hear 
Another Immigration Imprisonment Case, CRIMMIGRATION (Mar. 20, 2018, 5:28 
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The concern about migrants’ welfare that erupted in the 
aftermath of Trump’s victory is a well-meaning and generally 
positive development, but it is also conceptually limited and 
ideologically perilous. Envisioning immigrant defense funds as 
anti-Trump tactics suggests that the present historical moment is 
unique in its dangers to migrants. The Trump-era spike in 
popularity suggests that defense funds are needed because the 
Trump Administration’s immigration enforcement practices are so 
roguish that they are victimizing migrants who do not deserve to 
be targeted. This rhetoric adopts the discursive frame of migrant 
criminality and, with it, the ideological commitment to exclude 
some people from the realm of the deserving. Designing immigrant 
defense funds around crime-based measures of deservingness 
suggests that the public’s goodwill is reserved for victims of 
unhinged Trump Administration enforcement practices. Because 
they are being attacked by a federal government unmoored from 
reason, cities, counties, and states should step in to offer protection 
at public expense. This logic reveals a disturbing vision of migrants 
as victims lacking any agency. Seemingly, they are worthy of 
collective protection only if they are innocently attacked. Lose 
either the innocence or the attack and the public’s goodwill 
evaporates. “We love our victims innocent,” writes Mladen Dolar; 
“we empathize with them as long as they appear to be innocent, 
but the moment they display some trait that is not entirely 
amiable . . . the sympathy is cut short.”121  
Deploying a characteristic of crimmigration laws and policies, 
defense fund exclusions use criminal adjudications as markers of 
lost innocence. In Los Angeles, a Democratic member of the city 
council pushed to ensure that people convicted of “heinous crimes” 
could not access the city’s contribution to an immigrant defense 
fund.122 As an example, she pointed to people who engage in human 
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trafficking.123 Even the example of human trafficking cannot be 
reduced to a binary that categorically separates victims from 
perpetrators. The United States, writes Jennifer Chacón, has 
adopted a problematic understanding of trafficking that requires 
people to evidence no consent at any stage of the transportation or 
employment process to win the “victim” label.124 As a result, people 
who willingly participate in their own transportation or unlawful 
employment are written out of federal anti-trafficking 
protections.125 They are, in effect, juridically prohibited from being 
trafficking victims. Implementing the lost innocence frame, federal 
officials have sought to remove people who willingly participated 
in their unauthorized presence in the United States even where 
they were among the lucky who survived gruesome conditions in 
the back of a tractor-trailer.126 Applying Chacón’s analysis, this 
comes as no surprise.127 The innocence-laden anti-trafficking legal 
regime, she writes, reflects the United States’ “out-sized fear 
of . . . criminal immigrants.”128 Stripped of innocence, they are 
deemed unworthy of assistance. 
In addition to immigrant defense funds’ troubling reliance on 
criminality to gauge morality, their newfound popularity among 
liberal elected officials reveals the political dimension of these 
officials’ notion of attack. The nightmare that President Obama 
oversaw was not sufficient to constitute an attack, but the 
ramped-up nightmare of President Trump’s first months in office 
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was somehow measurably different.129 Surely more migrants are 
worse off under President Trump than under President Obama, 
but treating Trump-era policies as a radical diversion from 
reasonable normalizes the heavy toll of Obama-era immigration 
policies.130 Uncritical claims that Trump’s policies are heinous 
suggests that all was fine prior to Trump’s assumption of power.131 
This is problematic for the many people whose lives were forever 
upended under President Obama. It is equally troubling as an 
ideological matter because it supposes that a significant amount of 
human devastation is acceptable so long as it is less devastation 
than is currently being meted out by Trump and his officials. 
Line-drawing of this sort is imprudent and impossible. As a 
practical matter, normalizing Obama-era immigration policies 
shifts the baseline of acceptability to what was then a historically 
severe level. Separately, it is impossible to adequately line draw 
between acceptable practices under Obama and excessive practices 
under Trump.132 No one can precisely pinpoint the division 
between acceptable and unacceptable human suffering. An 
immigration system that forces many people into legal limbo, 
commodifies the marginality that results, then capitalizes on that 
marginalized labor, is, at best, morally dubious. At worst, it further 
buries the very human catastrophe of immigration law 
enforcement premised on divisions between deserving and 
undeserving baked in criminal processes that disproportionately 
penalize poor people and people of color.  
There is a crisis in immigration law enforcement, but the crisis 
did not begin with Trump’s ascendance nor will it end with his final 
day in office. Rather, the immigration law crisis of the early 
twenty-first century is not so different from the immigration law 
crisis of the late twentieth century.133 The crisis arises from 
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immigration law’s convergence with criminal law to birth a 
crimmigration regime that operates ideologically to create easily 
exploitable labor. Through its reliance on substantive and 
procedural laws that impact communities of color most harmfully, 
crimmigration reproduces racial subordination while 
simultaneously producing material wealth for the privileged.134 In 
the words of Yolanda Vázquez, “crimmigration disparately affects 
Latinos and . . . reif[ies] the conclusion that Latinos break more 
criminal and immigration laws due to their behavior 
choices . . . .”135 This has the effect, she adds, of “maintaining the 
status quo of white racial dominance.”136 At the same time, the 
network of public and private parties that profit from 
crimmigration policies is vast.137  
VI. Embracing Utopias 
Despite the problematic aspect of immigrant defense funds 
sudden popularity, they offer enormous actual and potential value. 
Most importantly, the development of immigrant defense funds 
means that many people will receive legal representation in 
removal proceedings who otherwise would have faced off alone 
against a government prosecutor.138 Bringing a trained legal 
advocate to the immigration courtroom is a significant 
improvement that cannot be overstated.139 To many migrants, it 
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means all the difference between a life with their family in the 
place they call home, and the loss “of all that makes life worth 
living,” as Justice Brandeis described deportation’s toll many years 
ago.140 Secondarily, defense funds offer an opportunity to launch 
critical conversations locally about the problematic expansion of 
migrant criminality norms. Activists with diverse foci are able to 
wield their collective knowledge about criminal justice and 
immigration proceedings.141 Advocates in New York have done so 
splendidly as they have formed diverse, expansive coalitions to 
resist the mayor’s attempts to exclude people with certain criminal 
records from the city-financed defense fund.142 Moreover, in the 
spirit of Bell’s interest convergence theory, the present moment 
creates an opportunity for elected officials to align with readily 
exploitable migrants.143 To paraphrase Homan, if migrants and 
elected officials are similar threats, they might as well ally.144  
As conversations continue about immigrant defense funds, it 
is likely that exclusions will remain part of the political jockeying. 
It seems inevitable that, at some point, someone who obtains legal 
assistance through a defense fund will be arrested for a crime. It 
is even possible that the accusation will center on indefensible 
violence. No amount of reference to the lower crime rate among 
migrants than native-born individuals145 will suffice to stop the 
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chorus of complaints that the defense fund’s existence endangered 
the community. Regardless of the details, it will be an opportunity 
to attack the defense fund’s continued viability. 
Framing immigrant defense funds around notions of migrants 
as victims leaves too much space for the inevitable tragedy to 
become an immigrant defense fund’s death knell. Instead, 
constructing the political rationale for an immigrant defense fund 
around the vagaries of using criminality as a marker of morality is 
likely to increase a fund’s resilience in the face of criticisms. Rather 
than imagine defense funds as protecting victims of Trump-era 
excessiveness, they are more solidly built as limits on the 
government’s coercive powers deployed through crimmigration law 
and law-enforcement procedures along the axes of race and class 
bias.146 
It is certainly a heavy lift to shift conversations about 
immigrant defense funds away from a frantic reaction to the 
perception that migrants in the United States are currently living 
through an unprecedented emergency named Trump.147 
Embracing a more nuanced critical analysis aimed at the more 
foundational crimmigration legal regime that has received 
bipartisan support for decades is indeed unlikely. Political 
calculations designed to address emergent, seemingly exceptional 
circumstances do not lend themselves easily to nuanced, 
contextualized critiques of accepted maxims.148 As such, urging 
reevaluation of immigrant defense funds even as they become 
increasingly common in major metropolitan areas throughout the 
United States admittedly appears utopian. But, as Hamza writes, 
“it seems increasingly clear that in desperate situations such as we 
are currently facing, utopias are the only viable solution.”149 
Proposing a utopian perspective on immigrant defense funds 
is not to embrace futility. It is, rather, an effort to preserve the 
hard-fought victory that established defense funds represent. If 
they are premised on the trope of migrant victimization, they are 
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essentially the policy version of a papier-mâché figurine: nice to 
look at, but easy to destroy. Ironically, the utopian vision of defense 
funds conceived as responses to a crimmigration legal regime that 
supports racial subordination and reproduces class privileges is 
the most likely to keep defense funds from becoming policies for 
this historical moment only. In this sense, the utopian approach to 
the development of immigrant defense funds may be the approach 
that most realistically stands a chance of solving the problem of 
migrants pushed into the immigration detention and removal 
pipeline without the benefit of legal counsel.150 
VII. Conclusion 
Immigrant defense funds are an important development in the 
long struggle to expand migrants’ position within the United 
States. Framing these pools of money as responses to the Trump 
Administration’s rabid approach to immigration law enforcement 
is reactionary and limiting.151 Migrants, their families, and their 
communities were detrimentally impacted by immigration law 
enforcement practices well before Trump entered the White 
House.152 With immigration law being entangled with criminal 
law, the marker of criminality has become the stigmatizing feature 
of choice for people interested in carving the migrant population 
into desirable and undesirable.153 Pointing to criminality as a 
measure of a person’s moral worth, however, ignores the well-worn 
racial and class biases of the criminal justice system.154 
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Instead of ignoring the faults of building an immigration law 
regime on top of discriminatory criminal justice practices, 
advocates and elected officials intent on creating welcoming 
atmospheres in their communities for migrants and their loved 
ones should dispense with the migrant-as-victim trope.155 As a 
whole, migrants are nothing more and nothing less than imperfect, 
fallible people. States, cities, and counties are right to expand 
access to legal counsel for individuals facing the possibility of 
forcible removal from the United States for the simple reason that 
removal proceedings are complicated affairs affecting, perhaps for 
a lifetime, complicated people.156 Flagged for removal by criminal 
law proceedings embedded with racial and class biases, the 
imperative only increases.157 Excluding some people because they 
were ensnared by discriminatory criminal justice practices only 
conceals the earlier indefensibility.158  
Immigrant defense funds are a form of resistance, but not 
against anything unique to Trump or his top immigration officials 
in DHS or the Justice Department.159 These funds, rather, present 
advocates and elected officials the opportunity to hold back the 
growth of exploitative laws and legal processes.160 By recognizing 
markers of criminality as inherently flawed assessments of moral 
worth, advocates and elected officials can resist the urge to exclude 
people from obtaining legal counsel under the auspices of an 
immigrant defense fund because of a criminal record.161 If they do 
this, they will stop immigration law from being just another 
adjunct of the United States’ long history of race and class bias. If 
they cave to the urge, defense funds are likely to fall prey to the 
fearmongering that will inevitably develop. When that happens, 
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cities and states now taking a step toward including migrants more 
fully in their collective understanding of membership in the 
political community will take a similarly large step backwards 
toward the pre-Trump norm of naively embracing the moral 
significance of criminal adjudications and, with it, the willingness 
to imprison and remove hundreds of thousands of people annually. 
The possibility of a policy whiplash affecting untold numbers of 
migrants and their family members is the avoidable crisis that a 
superficial interest convergence lays bare. 
